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LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The past year was considerably more tranquil than recent years
with regard to legal developments involving children. For example,
there were no major United States Supreme Court decisions directly affecting children, and the 1991 Virginia General Assembly's
actions impacted on children mainly through budget cuts and the
disappointing abolition of the Department for Children - a result
of those cuts. Virginia's child labor laws were extensively revised in
1991, but few of these revisions will make a noticeable difference in
the work relationships of the state's youth because they largely
conform state law to existing federal law. Finally, legislation was
enacted, after several sessions failed to do so, regarding surrogacy
contracts and assisted conception technologies.
II.
A.

ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER CARE, AND TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS

Abuse and Neglect

The appalling toll that abuse and neglect has on the children of
Virginia continues to be reflected in the pages of numerous court
decisions, mirroring what the United States Advisory Board on
Child Abuse and Neglect has called a "national emergency."' In
Campbell v. Commonwealth,2 the Virginia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed the malicious wounding conviction of a father for beatings he administered with a leather belt to his two
children. The injuries inflicted upon one son were so severe that
they "shocked" the mother and grandmother. The court commented that the photographs recording the injuries revealed "an
* Professor of Law, The T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A.,
1959, Washington and Lee University; LL.B., 1961, Washington and Lee University.
1. UNITED STATES ADVISORY BOARD ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLEM, CRITICAL FIRST STEPS IN RESPONSE TO A NATIONAL EMERGENCY vii (Dept. of

Human Services 1990).

2. 12 Va. App.

-, 405 S.E.2d 1 (1991).
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appalling story of a brutal beating of a three-year-old child." 3 The
court held that excessive disciplining of a child could result in a
malicious wounding prosecution. It reasoned that an intent to disfigure or disable could be inferred from the force with which blows
were applied and the location of the injuries when considering the
"comparative weakness of the victim and the strength of the ag-

gressor.

.

.

. "4

This decision helps to resolve a long-standing de-

bate in Virginia concerning the boundaries of a malicious wounding prosecution in a child abuse situation.5
Another case involving the "discipline" of a child by a custodian
was Walker v. Commonwealth.' In Walker, the mother's live-in
boyfriend was convicted of the sexual battery of her seven-year-old
daughter. The court opined that sexual battery could be a lesser
included offense of aggravated sexual battery. Furthermore, evidence that Walker had placed his finger in the child's vagina
before being interrupted by a knock on the apartment door was
sufficient to sustain the conviction.
In Fisher v. Commonwealth,7 the court overturned a man's conviction for the aggravated sexual battery of his six-year-old stepgranddaughter. The court based its decision on the trial court's refusal to consider post-trial evidence that the girl had been extensively exposed to explicit hard core pornography in her home. The
grandfather's conviction was largely based on the child's graphic
testimony and accusations. Thus, evidence which was highly relevant to the defense, but unavailable to it, could have explained the
step-granddaughter's familiarity with male anatomy8
Likewise, the court in Carter v. Commonwealth9 reversed the defendant's conviction for rape and forcible sodomy of his six-yearold daughter. This reversal was the result of a serious potential
conflict of interest between the defendant and his counsel. There
were allegations that the defense attorneys had acted inappropriately in their pretrial contacts with the defendant's wife, who was
3. Campbell, 12 Va. App. at -, 405 S.E.2d at 5.
4. Id. at -,
405 S.E.2d at 5.
5. Judge Benton discusses some of these issues in his dissenting opinion where he argues
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for malicious wounding and addresses much of the earlier case law. Id. at _.
6. 12 Va. App. -,
404 S.E.2d 394 (1991).
7. 11 Va. App. 302, 397 S.E.2d 901 (1990).
8. Id. at 303, 397 S.E.2d at 902.
9. 11 Va. App. 569, 400 S.E.2d 540 (1991).
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also the victim's mother.10
Another interesting factual situation was presented in Accomack
County Department of Social Services v. Muslimani." In Muslimani, the Department of Social Services sought to obtain custody
of three girls from their natural father, Muslimani. The department instituted proceedings because of a prior sexual relationship
Muslimani had experienced with his oldest stepdaughter. 2 Muslimani's prior wife had two young daughters when they married.
The couple then had three daughters together, the subjects of this
custody proceeding.' Muslimani began having sex with his oldest
stepdaughter when she was either ten or eleven. This relationship
resulted in the birth of two children, the first occurring when the
stepdaughter was only twelve years old.' 4
At the trial, a psychiatrist testified that despite this relationship
he did not believe the stepdaughter was sexually abused, reasoning
that it was common in Muslimani's culture to marry young. Thus,
in his opinion, Muslimani should have custody of his three natural
daughters, who, incidentally, were all at or near the age that the
oldest stepdaughter was when the sexual contact began. 1 5 The trial
court relied on the psychiatrist's testimony in granting custody to
the father.
Based on an affidavit by a second psychiatrist, the department
subsequently petitioned the trial court to reopen the case and vacate the custody order. The second psychiatrist, from the same
professional group as the testifying psychiatrist, opined that sexual
intercourse between a girl of ten or eleven years and her thirtyeight-year-old stepfather constituted sexual abuse. The affidavit
concluded that the custody decision should not have been based on
the testimony of the testifying psychiatrist. 6 The trial court refused to reopen the case. However, on appeal the case was reversed. The court of appeals concluded that the governing principle in the case was the best interests of the child, rather than the
10. Id. at 574, 400 S.E.2d at 543. The court noted that the lawyers were forced to defend
their professional conduct as well as the defendant during the trial because of the trial
judge's refusal to conduct An evidentiary inquiry into the possible conflict of interest. This
created a presumption of a conflict of interest. Id. at 573-74, 400 S.E.2d at 542-43.
11. 12 Va. App. -, 403 S.E.2d 1 (1991).
12. Id. at
, 403 S.E.2d at 1.
13. Id.
14. Id. at
16. Id. at

403 S.E.2d at 1-2.

-,

15. Id. at

,
-,

403 S.E.2d at 2.
403 S.E.2d at 3.
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finality of judicial decisionmaking. It further observed that the
sexual relationship admittedi7 by Muslimani constituted a serious
criminal offense in Virginia.
Two circuit court opinions have addressed issues involving the
preliminary stage of child abuse investigations. In the case of In re
J.B.,' s the Fairfax County Circuit Court decided that a juvenile
and domestic relations district court judge had the authority to appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor child to represent the child's
interests during the investigation of a child abuse complaint.' In
K.A.M. v. Miller,20 the Smyth County Circuit Court ruled that the
accused in a "founded" child abuse complaint had the right to examine the records of the investigation, but was not entitled to see
portions of the records which identified the complainant or collateral sources.
The most highly publicized legislative development in this area
during the 1991 General Assembly session was the enactment of
legislation establishing a special statute of limitations for civil suits
brought by adults who were victims of childhood sexual abuse.2 '
The new law creates a twelve-month "window," effective July 1,
1991. During this "window" period any survivor of child sexual
abuse may sue an abuser in tort for such acts, regardless of when
the abuse initially occurred or how much time has elapsed since
the victim discovered the abuse.2 2 In the future, a cause of action
based on injury "resulting from sexual abuse .

.

. during the

[childhood] or incompetency of [a] person, [accrues] when the fact
of the injury and [the] causal connection to abuse is first communicated to the [victim] by a licensed physician, psychologist or
clinical psychologist.

' 23

Thus, the two-year statute of limitations

for personal actions does not begin running until that communication occurs, or the victim reaches majority, whichever is later. 24
Section 8.01-249 of the Code of Virginia ("Code"), however, further provides that no action based on such sexual abuse may be
brought more than ten years after the "removal of the disability of
17. Muslimani, 12 Va. App. at -, 403 S.E.2d at 4.
18. 19 Va. Cir. 158 (County of Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1990).
19. The court relied on VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(D) (Repl. Vol. 1988) to reach this
conclusion.
20. 19 Va. Cir. 220 (County of Smyth Cir. Ct. 1990).
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249 (Cune. Supp. 1991).
22. Act of April 3, 1991, ch. 674, 2 1991 Va. Acts 1273.
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
24. Id.
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infancy or incompetency" regardless of the time of communication,
or more than ten years after "the last act by the same perpetrator
which was part of a common scheme or plan of abuse. '2 5 The definition of sexual abuse as provided by this section includes "rape,
sodomy, inanimate object sexual penetration,-. . . sexual battery,"
or other acts of sexual abuse defined in paragraph 6 of section
18.2-67.10 of the Code."
Other legislation was enacted by the General Assembly which
impacted abuse and neglect law. Section 18.2-370.1 of the Code
was amended to clarify that persons proscribed thereby from taking indecent liberties with a child include, but are not limited to, a
parent or other such custodian. 7 Section 18.2-57.2 of the Code was
added to make assault and battery against a family member, including a child or grandchild, a Class 1 misdemeanor and a third or
subsequent conviction a Class 6 felony.28 Section 9-173.7 of the
Code was amended to give local boards the authority to govern
court-appointed special advocate (CASA) programs. 2 9 Additionally,
1991 legislation expanded the powers of the juvenile and domestic
relations district courts by granting them the authority to enter
protective orders in spousal abuse cases, 30 and "recklessly [leaving]
a loaded, unsecured firearm in such a manner as to endanger. . . a
child under the age of fourteen, 3 1 was made a Class 3 misdemeanor. Furthermore, procedures for addressing the reporting and
investigation of child deaths where an autopsy indicates evidence
of abuse or neglect were established.3 2 Resolutions of the 1991 session continued the "Joint Subcommittee Studying the Problems of
Maternal and Perinatal Drug Exposure and Abuse and the Impact
on Subsidized Adoption and Foster Care. '33 Finally, "a joint sub25. Id.
26. Id.
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
28. Id. § 18.2-57.2. Although the new section broadens the definitions to include "household members," which may be one with whom the victim has a child in common, § 16.1241(J) of the Code was not similarly amended to give the juvenile courts jurisdiction over
such criminal charges.
29. Id. § 9-173.7(B)(2).
30. Id. §§ 16.1-241, -253.2, -253.4, 19.2-81.3. The legislation also broadens the definition of
such abuse to include persons with whom the abuser "has a child in common", and it includes sanctions for violations of protective orders in child abuse as well as spouse abuse
matters, and permits arrest without a warrant.
31. Id. § 18.2-56.2.
32. Id. § 32.1-285(B); see generally id. § 63.1-248.6 (Interim Supp. 1991) (for the procedure the department must follow when it receives this information).
33. H.J. Res. 387, 1991 Reg. Sess., 2 1991 Va. Acts 1920.
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committee to study the need for restructuring . . . local social services delivery systems"' 4 in the state was also established.
B.

Foster Care and Termination of Residual Parental Rights

In Stanley v. Fairfax County Department of Social Services,35
the court of appeals concluded that the statutory requirement for a
separate proceeding to terminate residual parental rights does not
require the initiation of a new case. Rather, only a separate hearing
on the termination question is required after a petition has been
filed specifically requesting termination so as to provide adequate
notice.3 6 Furthermore, a foster care plan outlining that termination
is in the best interest of the child must accompany, or be filed
prior to, the petition seeking termination. 37 The court also discussed the role of the guardian ad litem, concluding that the appointed guardian ad litem had the authority to file a petition seeking termination of residual parental rights. 8 The supreme court
affirmed the conclusion of the court of appeals in a decision limited
to the issue of the guardian ad litem's authority. 9
Three other cases also dealt with the termination of the residual
rights of parents who were incarcerated, with quite differing results. In Kaywood v. Halifax County Department of Social Services,4 0 the court of appeals affirmed the termination of a father's
parental rights where he was serving a twenty-year sentence for
abusing the child. The court considered several factors: the father
had inflicted severe injuries on the boy and sought no medical
treatment for the injuries; the father demonstrated a persistent inability to hold a full-time job; and the father had shown no interest
in establishing any visitation rights with the child.4 '
Conversely, in Cain v. Commonwealth ex rel. Department of So34. H.J. Res. 314, 1991 Reg. Sess., 2 1991 Va. Acts 1872.
35. 10 Va. App. 596, 395 S.E.2d 199 (1990).
36. Id. at 601-02, 395 S.E.2d at 202.
37. Id. at 602, 395 S.E.2d at 204; see VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(A) (Repl. Vol. 1988).
38. Stanley, 10 Va. App. at 602-03, 395 S.E.2d at 201-03; see also Norfolk Division of
Social Services v. Unknown Father, 2 Va. App. 420, 345 S.E.2d 533 (1986).
39. Stanley v. Fairfax Co. Dept. of Social Services, 12 Va. App. -, 405 S.E.2d 621 (1991).
The court reaffirmed the expansive view of the guardian's role, relying in part on § 16.1-227
of the Code which states that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court law
should be "construed liberally and as remedial in character." VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-227
(Cum. Supp. 1991).
40. 10 Va. App. 535, 394 S.E.2d 492 (1990).
41. Id. at 539-40, 394 S.E.2d at 493-94.
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cial Services for the City of Roanoke,42 the court concluded that
termination of parental rights was inappropriate for a mother who
was imprisoned when there was no showing that the department
had developed or offered any services to enable the mother to recover custody of her children. 43 The court observed that the
mother's incarceration alone could not per se establish good cause
for termination of parental rights."
The third case similarly dealt with an incarcerated parent and
residual parental rights. Tullos v. Roanoke City Department of
Social Services45 involved a mother imprisoned for the murder of
another child. In Tullos, the court upheld the termination of parental rights, but not premised solely on her incarceration. It also
based its decision on evidence that the mother had let her abusive
husband back in the home; that she failed to report home difficulties to the department;
and, that she intentionally murdered the
46
child's sibling.
The 1991 General Assembly was also active in this area. It enacted legislation requiring courts to assess fees for payment to the
departments of social services or court services units, for investigations, supervised visitation, or mediation services.47 Other legislation addressed arrangements for foster care placements pursuant
to verbal agreements with parents or agencies, 48 and mandated

that foster care plans include descriptions of the programs and services available to assist in preparing foster children sixteen years
old or over for the transition from foster care to independent living, where appropriate.49
III.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR

In Johnson v. Commonwealth,0 the court of appeals upheld the
admission of a confession by a fifteen-year-old boy convicted of
murder. The juvenile was a good student, capable of reading and
writing at a seventh grade level, and suffered from no disabilities.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

12 Va. App. 42, 402 S.E.2d 682 (1991).
Id. at 45, 402 S.E.2d at 684.
Id. at 44, 402 S.E.2d at 683.
12 Va. App. -,
405 S.E.2d 433 (1991).
Id. at -, 405 S.E.2d 434.
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-274 (Cure. Supp. 1991).
Id. §§ 63.1-56, -204 (Interim Supp. 1991).
Id. §§ 16.1-281, -282 (B)(&)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
12 Va. App. -,
404 S.E.2d 384 (1991).
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He was also advised of and waived his rights in the presence of his
father, an ordained minister, prior to questioning. Yet, the court
recognized that false representations were made to the youth during interrogation by one of the police officers. Nevertheless, little
attention was paid to this fact, despite the presumptive greater
vulnerability of the suspect because of his age.5 1 The court also
rejected the contention that prejudicial error was committed by
the trial judge when, prior to sentencing, he read from Johnson's
file an inculpatory statement made by the youth to the juvenile
court's intake officer.2 The court's opinion further notes the
weight accorded by the trial judge to this matter. The judge
brought the matter to the attention of the commonwealth's attorney, suggesting that the intake officer be called as a witness at the
sentencing hearing.53
This court's decision renders section 16.1-261 of the Code, which
insulates the intake process from the rest of the proceedings, virtually lifeless, thus undermining the strong policy of encouraging
candor by juveniles in the intake process. Lawyers representing
youths prior to intake should now be more reticent to advise the
child to "come clean." The court of appeals would have been welladvised to remand the case for resentencing before another judge.
This is similar to the absolute right that a juvenile who is retained
in the juvenile court after a transfer hearing has to a new judge
because of the transfer hearing judge's exposure to evidence which
54
later becomes inadmissible in the adjudicatory hearing.
In California v. Hodari D.,55 a juvenile running from an approaching unmarked police car was chased by the police. Just prior
to being tackled by a police officer, the youth threw away a rock of
crack cocaine. The Court held that, for fourth amendment purposes, no seizure occurred when the youth threw the rock of crack
cocaine. The majority concluded that the cocaine was abandoned
51. Johnson, 12 Va. App. at -, 404 S.E.2d at 386.
52. When a juvenile is transferred to the circuit court for trial as an adult, the sentencing
is done by the judge, regardless of whether guilt or innocence is heard by a jury. VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-272 (Repl. Vol. 1988). The juvenile and domestic relations district court law
insulates the intake process from subsequent proceedings by making statements made by
the juvenile to the intake officer inadmissible at any stage of subsequent proceedings. Id. §
16.1-261.
53. 12 Va. App. at -, 404 S.E.2d at 387. The court doesn't even mention the questionable propriety of this communication between the judge and one party in an adversarial
setting.
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
55. 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
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while the young man was running; therefore its recovery by the
police was not the result of a seizure, and certainly not the product
of an illegal seizure.5 6
This year, all the other cases in this area addressed the use of
prior juvenile adjudications for various purposes. In Lavinder v.
Commonwealth,57 a court of appeals panel concluded that the
prosecutor's cross-examination of a defendant about his juvenile
convictions for impeachment purposes was erroneous and not
9 the court of
harmless error.5 8 Then in Moats v. Commonwealth,"
appeals decided that the judge in a murder trial properly refused
to permit the defendant to impeach the credibility of witnesses
with their prior juvenile convictions, as distinguished from specific
bias. The court noted that the trial court allowed questioning regarding the juvenile witnesses' probation status to demonstrate the
possibility that the witnesses "were trying to curry favor with probation officers or law enforcer officials." 6 0 Furthermore, in Peterson
v. Murray,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit ruled that juvenile adjudications could be considered during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial in Virginia. Then in
United States v. Daniels,6 2 the court concluded that a federal
court may consider juvenile convictions in determining the applicable sentencing guideline range in a criminal case.
Legislation enacted in 1991 permits the chief judge of a juvenile
and domestic relations district court to establish a voluntary civil
mediation program and specifies that diversion may take place
within as well as outside the juvenile justice system. 3 New legislation also grants the Commonwealth's Attorney the discretion to
prosecute misdemeanor charges in the juvenile court;64 eliminates
56. Id. at 1552.
57. 12 Va. App. -,
395 S.E.2d 211 (1990) (reh'g en banc granted).
58. The court reaffirmed the holding of the earlier supreme court decision in Kiracofe v.
Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957), despite the intervening revision of the
juvenile code which substituted an adjudicatory finding of guilt for the earlier characterization of "not innocent." The court of appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed this decision.
Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. -, 395 S.E.2d 211 (1991).
59. 12 Va. App. -,
404 S.E.2d 244 (1991).
60. Id. at -, 404 S.E.2d at 247. The cross-examination permitted was that contemplated
by the Supreme Court in Davis v. Alaska, 405 U.S. 308 (1974).
61. 904 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 537 (1991).
62. 929 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1991).
63. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-69.35, -227 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
64. Id. § 16.1-232.
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the necessity of a petition in alcohol-related offenses in the court;6 5
and permits the use of substituted service pursuant to section 8.01296(2) of the Code for juvenile court summons. 6 Other enactments
included a bill permitting localities to adopt ordinances prohibiting
the possession of loaded firearms by a juvenile in a public place or
on a public highway.6 7 Legislation was also passed expanding the
prohibition against selling tobacco products to or possession of
such products by juveniles up to age eighteen.' The penalty for
violation of this law was made a civil penalty instead of a penal
fine.6 9

The legislature performed more fine-tuning of the "abuse and
lose" legislation,"0 and embarked on a major recodification of section 16.1-279 of the Code, the dispositional section. Section 16.1279 of the Code was broken down into eighteen separate sections,
sections 16.1-278.1 through 16.1-278.18, with each addressing the
dispositional alternatives in a particular type of case. 71 Furthermore, section 16.1-278.19 of the Code, which was enacted as part of
the same bill, provides that "in any matter properly before the
court, the court may award attorneys' fees and costs on behalf of
any party as the court deems appropriate based on the relative financial ability of the parties."7 2 The purpose of the section is unclear, especially as it interrelates with section 16.1-267 of the Code,
which governs the payment of counsel. Legislation dealing with the
private operation of juvenile detention facilities was also enacted
by the General Assembly. 73 Finally, the Assembly requested that
the Virginia State Crime Commission study the issue of releasing
identifying information about juveniles. 4
65. VA. CODE ANN.

§

16.1-260.

66. Id. § 16.1-264. This legislation negates the effect of the holding in Garrity v. Virginia
Dep't of Social Serv., 11 Va. App. 39, 396 S.E.2d 150 (1990).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-287.3 (Cum. Supp. 1991). The section does have some exceptions to the prohibition and only provides for a fine and forfeiture of the weapon as a
penalty.
68. Id. § 18.2-371.2.
69. Id.
70. Id. § 16.1-279 (Virginia Code Commission codified the amendment to § 16.1-279 as
part of the new dispositional statutory scheme).
71. For other changes along similar lines see the following sections of the Code of Virginia: 8.01-511, 16.1-228, -253.3, -260, -274, -278.1, -278.19, -286, -291, -292, -296, -298, 18.264.1, -119, 20-49, -78.1, -79.1. -79.2, 37.1-97, 63.1-195, -226, 66-13, -17. Id. There are no real
substantive changes in these sections.
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.19.

73. Id. §§ 16.1-322.5 -322.7.
74. S.J. Res. 212, 1991 Reg. Sess., 2 1991 Va. Acts 2120.

1991]

LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN

783

IV. AD)OPTION
Several recent Virginia cases have dealt with the subject of
adoption. In Welborn v. Doe 75 the court of appeals upheld the
right of a husband, who consented to artificial insemination with
sperm from an anonymous donor, to file a petition to adopt twins
born as the result of the insemination. Although section 64.1-7.1 of
the Code currently creates a presumption that a child born as a

result of artificial insemination is the child of a consenting husband, it is rebuttable, and therefore the adoption proceeding would
conclusively establish a parent-child relationship. Additionally, the
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond set aside an adoption order
in the case of In re Adoption of A.R.M.,71 concluding that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 77 was inapplicable to adoption
proceedings and that the adoption was void because proper notice
was not given to the birth mother in the adoption proceeding. Finally, in the case of In re Adoption of Renaud'7 8 the court concluded that where a natural parent withholds consent to an adoption, that parent cannot waive the required reference to the
Superintendent of Public Welfare for an investigation.
There have been various legislative developments in the area of
adoption. Changes include: amending section 63.1-220.3 of the
Code, which governs adoption placements by a parent or legal
guardian, by deleting the requirement for a meeting between the
birth parent and prospective adoptive parents where the latter are
related to the child as grandparents, adult sibling or adult aunt or
uncle; delineating instances where the consent of the father of a
child born to an unmarried woman is not required; allowing the
execution of the consent to adoption to occur before a notary,
rather than the judge, where the adoption is to be by relatives; and
providing for the transfer of the child directly to the adoptive parents after the consent is accepted by the court, rather than appointing them as guardians of the child. 79 Other legislation specifies that a married couple or an unmarried individual may adopt;80
and that an adoption petition must be signed by the petitioner and
counsel, as well as be under oath if an adoption without referral for
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

10 Va. App. 631, 394 S.E.2d 732 (1990).
20 Va. Cir. 301 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. 1990).
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-125 to -146 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
21 Va. Cir. 293 (County of Stafford Cir. Ct. 1990).
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-220.3, -221 (Interim Supp. 1991).
Id. §§ 63.1-220.2, -220.3 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
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investigation is sought."'
V.

PATERNITY AND ILLEGITIMACY

There have been several recent developments in the area of paternity and illegitimacy. In Wyatt v. Virginia Department of Social Services, 2 the court affirmed a finding of paternity predicated
on a clear and convincing standard of proof, the applicable statutory standard at the time of the de novo hearing in the circuit
court. This occurred despite that when the proceeding was in the
juvenile court a higher reasonable doubt standard governed.83 In
Slagle v. Slagle,8 4 an ex-husband was barred from raising the issue
of paternity in a subsequent child support proceeding, and was
held to be obligated to pay child support where the divorce decree
recited that the child was "born of the marriage. 8 s5 The court did

not allow the blood test admitted in the later proceeding establishing non-paternity to affect the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 8 In Batrouny v. Batrouny,8 7 a circuit court set aside
a divorce decree because the wife fraudulently misrepresented that
the husband was the father of her first child. 8 Lastly, legislation
amended section 20-88.26:1 of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) to permit the continuance of a case
when additional proof regarding paternity is required from a nonresident obligee 89 And, section 64.1-5.2 of the Code was also
amended conforming the methods of proving paternity to those
contained elsewhere in the Code. 0
Another important bill provides that a child conceived and born
to a married couple, consenting in writing to the performance of
reproductive technology and accepting the parentage of any resulting child, will result in the child being the legitimate natural child
of the couple.91 The reproductive technology may include artificial
81. Id. § 63.1-221.
82. 11 Va. App. 225, 397 S.E.2d 412 (1990).
83. See id.
84. 11 Va. App. 341, 398 S.E.2d 346 (1990).
85. Id. at 343, 398 S.E.2d 347.
86. Id. at 348, 398 S.E.2d at 350.
87. 21 Va. Cir. 388 (County of Chesterfield Cir. Ct. 1990).
88. Id. at 388.
89. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88.26:1 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
90. Id. § 64.1-5.2. Methods added include genetic blood grouping tests and medical or
anthropological evidence on parentage based on tests performed by experts.
91. Id. §§ 32.1-256, 64.1-7.1.
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insemination, in vitro fertilization, or other technology performed
under the supervision of a licensed health care professional, and
donors of sperm or ova will have no parental rights or duties concerning the child.9 2 Extensive legislation was also enacted creating
Chapter 9 in Title 20 on the status of children of assisted conception.9 3 This statutory scheme takes effect on July 1, 1993. It covers
assisted conception and sanctions surrogacy contracts, although it
requires prior court approval of such contracts. 4
VI.

EDUCATION

Several cases have been recently decided which impact on the
area of educating children in Virginia. In Johnson v. Prince William County School Board, 5 the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the decision of the school board that a couple's desire for
home instruction of their children was based on political or philosophical belief rather than bona fide religious training or belief,
thus denying approval.9 6 The Johnsons contended that both the
school board and the circuit court erroneously applied a two-prong
test to the question. This test required .them to not only establish
that their desire for home instruction was based on religious belief,
but also that their beliefs could not be accommodated by other
alternatives to public school attendance. 97 The supreme court held
that the first prong was the only inquiry to be resolved under the
law. It further concluded that both lower decisionmakers had correctly resolved that question against the Johnsons, with the evidence fully supporting those conclusions.9 8 Three justices dissented, agreeing with the parents that an impermissible second
prong had been added to the statutory test by the earlier
decisionmakers. 9
Two cases involving the education of handicapped children were
decided by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Tice v.
Botetourt County School Board,10 0 the court decided that the
92. Id.
93. Id. §§ 20-156, -165.
94. Id. The legislation also amends §§ 32.1-261, 32.1-289.1 and 63.1-236.1 of the Code of
Virginia. Id.
95. 241 Va. 383, 404 S.E.2d 209 (1991).
96. Id. at 392, 404 S.E.2d at 213.
97. Id. at 385, 404 S.E.2d at 210-11.
98. Id. at 389-90, 404 S.E.2d at 211.
99. Id. at 395, 404 S.E.2d at 215.
100. 908 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1990).
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school system did not provide a learning disabled and emotionally
disturbed youth a "free appropriate public education" during his
psychiatric hospitalization. Consequently, the school board will be
obligated to reimburse the parents for the educational and related
services portion of the costs of that placement, if the lower court
finds that the placement was appropriate. 1°1 The parents need not
establish a causal connection between the denial of appropriate
services and the subsequent hospitalization. They need only show
that the schools denied the child his or her right to services under
the special education laws and regulations.
In Goodall v. Stafford County School Board,10 2 the court addressed the constitutional problems presented by the provision of
special education services in private religious schools. The court
concluded that the special education laws do not require that a
cued speech interpreter be provided to a deaf student in a private
religious school, even though the state would be obligated to provide such a service in a public school or in a private nonsectarian
school if the child is placed there either by the state or pursuant to
the child's individualized education plan.
Legislation adopted at the 1991 General Assembly session made
some portions of the school dropout prevention statutes effective
July 1, 1991, and other portions effective on July 1, 1992.13 Other
legislation was enacted which impacts the area of education, including: requiring law enforcement officers to report to the school
division arrests of school personnel for certain sexual offenses;0
increasing the fines for drinking or possessing alcoholic beverages
on school property; 10 5 broadening the prohibition against carrying
certain weapons on school property to include a prohibition of possessing such weapons as well; 0 6 and permitting juvenile and domestic relations district courts to require a juvenile charged with
certain offenses to attend alternative educational programs instead
of the regular instructional program. 10 7 The General Assembly also
101. Tice, 908 F.2d at 1208.
102. 920 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1991).
103. Acts of March 20, 1991, ch. 295, 1 1991 Va. Acts 416 (amending and reenacting ch.
797 of the 1990 Acts). See amendments to VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-279, 18.2-371, 22.1-17.1,
-209, -209.1:1, -253.13:1, -254, -258, -262, -263, -265, -267, -274, -279.2, -280.1, -289, -344
(Cum. Supp. 1991).
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-83.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
105. Id. §§ 4-78.1, -112.4.
106. Id. § 18.2-308.1.
107. Id. § 22.1-257.
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continued the study of special education services for handicapped
youth in Virginia jails.' 05
VII.

MENTAL HEALTH

The General Assembly made a few technical amendments in the
Psychiatric Inpatient Treatment of Minors Act enacted last
year, e" and increased the fees for special justices and substitute
judges who sit in commitment hearings." 0
VIII.

MISCELLANEOUS

In Doe v. Dewhirst,"' the Supreme Court of Virginia reaffirmed
the rule that a child between the ages of seven and fourteen is presumed incapable of contributory negligence. Yet, this presumption
may be overcome "when the evidence shows that a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience would understand the
danger of his conduct under the same or similar circumstances. "112
The General Assembly also effectuated other legislation. It created
a Commission on Early Childhood and Child Day Care Programs; ll3 abolished the Department for Children as a separate
agency;"' and made the release of fifty or more nonbiodegradable
balloons within an hour an offense under certain conditions, with a
civil penalty, for environmental reasons. "1 5
The 1991 General Assembly also enacted a general revision of
the child labor laws at the behest of the Special Subcommittee
Studying Child Labor Laws." 6 The legislation enacted generally
conforms Virginia law to the various federal provisions relating to
the employment of children, and provides for greater administrative involvement in the child labor area through the promulgation
108.' H. J. Res. 367, 1991 Reg. Sess., 2 1991 Va. Acts 1905.
109. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-336, -338, -341, -346, -346.1, 37.1-67.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991). See
Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving Children: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 24 U. RICH. L.
REV. 629, 649 (1990).
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-89 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
111. 240 Va. 266, 396 S.E.2d 840 (1990).
112. Id. at 268, 396 S.E.2d at 842.
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-291.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
114. Acts of March 25, 1991, ch. 563, 1 1991 Va. Acts 1009.
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-556.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991). This provision is included in this
survey because of the past popularity of balloon releases by school groups and other groups
of children.
116. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL SuncoMMITraa STUDYING CHILD LABOR LAws, H. Doc.
No. 51, 1991 Reg. Sess.
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of regulations. Yet, there are some deviations from federal law with
respect to employment in agricultural occupations not in interstate
commerce. Also, the fines for violation o the law were increased
generally from $250 to $1,000, and the penalty for cruelty117to children was raised from a misdemeanor to a Class 6 felony.

117. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-241, -260, -279, 40-78, -79.01, -79.1, -80.1, -81.1, -84, -85, -87,
-89, -92, -93, -96, -100, -101, -109, -112, -113 (Cum. Supp. 1991).

